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Abstract 
France’s 1968-72 intervention in Chad constitutes a forgotten turning point in the Fifth 
Republic’s foreign relations.  Inter-connected institutions and treaties gave France a 
disproportionate influence over its African ex-colonies.  French security guarantees 
underscored this system, however, whereby francophone African leaders continued to accept 
French economic and political leadership.  French leaders discovered in Chad, however, that 
they had fewer choices and needed to dedicate more resources to fulfilling these commitments 
than President Charles de Gaulle had intended.  Prosperous ex-colonies’ leaders judged French 
commitments’ value according to how France responded to crises in its least valued ex-
colonies.  Thus, although French analysts viewed intervening in Chad as irrational from a 
cost/benefit perspective, they found themselves pressured into doing so by other African 
governments who let it be known that they would interpret failing to support Chadian President 
François Tombalbye as a sign that they too could not count on France.  Entrapped by prior 
commitments, French policymakers developed a new approach to using force, which I term 
strategic satisficing, far different from traditional French counterinsurgency practices.  The 
tightly-coupled application of force and diplomacy in pursuit of limited objectives enables 
France to intervene with the frequency needed to uphold its post-colonial order in Africa.   
 
Introduction 
France’s role in Africa sets it apart from other states of its size.  France is arguably the 
most politically potent foreign actor in Sub-Saharan Africa even though it is today a medium-
sized European state with an economy that only occasionally ranks amongst the world’s top 
half dozen.  French firms occupy privileged positions in its former colonies’ markets and 
France’s Central Bank regulates their financial institutions.  France also mobilizes francophone 
Africa’s votes for its initiatives at the United Nations, and Francophile Africans, such as 
Senegal’s Leopold Senghor and Tunisia’s Habib Bourghiba, secured the French language’s 
role continuing within international organizations.   
Security ties are, however, the foundation of France’s power in Africa.  
Decolonization’s architects, particularly Charles de Gaulle and Jacques Foccart, calculated that 
individual ex-colonies would be too small to defend themselves.  They therefore envisaged a 
two-tiered security system that would perpetuate French influence at a modest cost to France.  
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African armies would, in theory, ensure domestic order and constitute their states’ first line of 
defense.  French forces, some of which were permanently stationed in Africa, would deter and, 
if necessary, intervene in a short, sharp fashion should it prove necessary.  French leaders 
embedded this architecture in the security treaties they concluded with their ex-colonies. 
The insecurity that afflicted several ex-colonies soon challenged this blueprint for 
maintaining political authority at a reasonable price and risked entrapping France in open-
ended conflicts.  Several ex-colonies, particularly those land-locked or stretching across the 
Sahel, faced chronic governance problems.  Rebellion became common in these poor, yet 
overly large and ethnically diverse states.  These states’ leaders, in turn, sought assistance to 
combat insurgents and courted other partners when France provided inadequate aid.   
This article examines how policymakers reconciled their desire to maintain France’s 
influence at minimal cost with the broader engagements that African leaders and their own 
armed forces urged them to undertake.  To this end, I examine France’s 1968-72 intervention 
in Chad, which constituted the first major challenge that France faced to its post-colonial order 
in Africa.1  To preview my conclusions, French leaders felt compelled to intervene, despite 
their misgivings about Chad, because they feared that non-intervention would tarnish French 
security guarantees’ value in the eyes of other African leaders.   
Once involved, however, France’s government pursued its objective of visibly honoring 
its treaty commitments in as economical a fashion as possible.  French leaders resisted 
commanders’ preferences for longer and more extensive counterinsurgencies and instead 
limited French aims to pacifying Chad’s most productive regions.  Authorities in Paris 
                                                          
1 This article draws on material from France’s Service Historique de la Défense 
(SHD), diplomatic documents from Documents Diplomatiques Français (DDF), and the 
French military’s internal study, Les Interventions Militaires Françaises au Tchad (IMFT). 
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empowered civilian officials, including Ambassador Fernand Wibaux and the leaders of 
France’s Mission for Administrative Reform (MRA), to supervise the armed forces to this end.   
I term the pattern that emerged during the 1968-72 Chadian intervention strategic 
satisficing—meaning the use of minimal force to produce satisfactory political outcomes—and 
suggest that it remains the leitmotif of French operations in Africa.  Interventions of this variety 
enabled France to intervene with the frequency needed to preserve its African sphere of 
influence and convince African governments that it remained a reliable partner.  The results, 
however, have been less salutary for France’s African allies, since France’s limited 
interventions and strategic satisficing have prolonged, rather than ended civil wars. 
 
French Power in Post-Colonial Africa 
France, more than other colonial powers, granted independence to its Sub-Saharan 
possessions in a matter calculated to perpetuate its power.  Despite the many individuals who 
shaped French decolonization policy, they collectively laid the basis for France’s “sphere of 
influence” or “chasse gardé” (hunting preserve).  France’s government, to this end, broke up 
France’s colonial federations—French Equatorial African (AEF) and French West Africa 
(AOF)—into twelve states that would necessarily remain military dependent on France due to 
their reduced size.  The Fifth Republic’s founders then integrated France’s colonies into 
French-dominated economic institutions as they granted them independence.  A network of 
security agreements, which French leaders believed they could uphold at a minimum cost, 
guaranteed this system’s solidity and incentivized states to adhere to it.   
France’s post-colonial order in Africa was not the product of a single architect, but was 
shaped by a host of actors during the transitional period between France’s Fourth and Fifth 
Republics.  Despite their diverse perspectives, French decolonization’s architects viewed 
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granting independence as an inevitable, yet unfortunate development.  They therefore explored 
a variety of formulas for rendering African states tributary to France in terms of their foreign 
relations and the marketization of their raw materials.   
Charles de Gaulle pursued this objective systematically after returning to power in 
1958.  He himself did not consider Africa particularly strategic and certainly less so than 
Europe or Asia, but viewed France’s dominion over 15 soon-to-be independent states as 
essential to its status.  De Gaulle therefore seized upon a proposal by Félix Houphouët-Boigny 
to grant African states independence within a French-dominated “federation”.  Côte d'Ivoire’s 
future president, Houphouët-Boigny, shaped French policy at this juncture thanks to his triple 
role as leader of the National Assembly’s largest African political party, a French cabinet 
minister between 1956 and 1960, and one of the Fifth Republic’s Constitution’s authors.2   
For de Gaulle, Houphouët-Boigny’s federation could enable France to embrace 
decolonization while perpetuating France’s control over its ex-colonies’ foreign and economic 
policies through federal institutions.3  De Gaulle’s collaborators soon translated this initiative 
into the French Community project.  The Community’s first general secretary, Raymond Janot, 
designed the Community’s institutions, such as an arbitration court and common financial 
institutions, to resolve disputes between the Community’s members and ensure France’s 
control over “strategic” natural resources.4    
                                                          
2 Frédéric Mel, “Félix Houphouët-Boigny: Le Ministre français qui est devenu chef 
d’état en Côte d’Ivoire,” in Jean-Pierre Bat et al., Jacques Foccart: archives ouvertes: La 
politique, l’Afrique et le monde (Paris: PUPS, 2017), 65-77. 
3 Frédéric Turpin, Jacques Foccart: Dans l’ombre de pouvoir (Paris: CNRS, 2015), 
129-37. 
4 Didier Maus, “La mise en oeuvre institutionnelle de la Communauté,” in Philippe 
Oulmont and Maurice Vaïsse, eds., De Gaulle et la décolonisation de l’Afrique 
subsaharienne (Paris: Karthala, 2014), 43-69. 
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Dynamics in Africa soon, however, disillusioned de Gaulle about the Community.  One 
colony, Guinea, voted against the Community in the 1958 referendum that de Gaulle organized 
to validate the project.  Worse still, even those leaders who originally supported the Community 
decided to demand full independence once they witnessed the prestige that leaders of fully-
sovereign states, such as Guinea’s Sekou Touré and Ghana’s Kwame Nkruma, enjoyed on the 
international stage.  The presidents of Madagascar and Mali began militating for full 
independence in 1959, but soon even Houphouët-Boigny joined them.5 
The Community’s failure drove de Gaulle to seek other means for perpetuating French 
power.  He consequently charged his Cooperation Minister, Jean Foyer, with negotiating 
accords with the leaders of France’s soon-to-be-independent colonies between 1959 and 1963.6  
These agreements were unequal considering that African leaders reasonably feared that French 
authorities would replace them should they prove intractable.  Most of the 15 colonies’ small 
size and dearth of resources, following Paris’ division of the two colonial federations into 12 
states, furthermore, meant that African leaders desperately needed French assistance, 
regardless of the cost.7 
  At a multilateral level, Paris preserved France’s colonial currency, the franc CFA, by 
incorporating representatives from its newly independent colonies into central banking 
                                                          
5 Turpin, 142-50. 
6 Sabine Jansen, “Jean Foyer, Artisan méconnu de la décolonisation,” in Oulmont and 
Vaïsse, eds., 82. 
7 France granted independence to 15 states in 1958-60.  Twelve were concentrated 
into two federations: AOF and AEF.  Cameroon and Togo were administered separately 
under UN mandates and Madagascar was administered separately due to its remoteness.  
Electoral assemblies existed at both the level of AEF and AOF and the individual territories, 
and decolonization could have produced either federation-sized or territory-sized entities.  
Pascal Geneste, “Jacques Foccart ou la politique africaine de la France gaullienne,” in 
Oulmont and Vaïsse, eds., 183-95. 
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institutions.  Through this policy, punctuated by accords with West African states in 1962 and 
Central African states in 1972, France perpetuated francophone Africa’s colonial monetary 
order up until the present day.8  Monetary union, in turn, facilitated French investments and 
incentivized francophone states to trade with France rather than other industrialized states.  De 
Gaulle’s government further strengthened France’s hold on African economies through 
financial instruments that guaranteed French corporate investments within the CFA zone.9   
France’s bilateral treaties, meanwhile, secured France’s access to “strategic” military 
facilities and raw materials.  Symbolic arrangements went hand-in-hand with these concrete 
dispositions.  Francophone governments, for example, consented to recognizing French 
ambassadors as the honorific doyens (or deans) of the foreign diplomatic corps based in their 
states and francophone Africa usually voted alongside France at the United Nations.  Most 
importantly, Francophone states implicitly accepted that France would remain their principal 
partner and they therefore refrained from developing significant ties with other powers.10 
France’s promise to continue providing security was, however, the sine qua non 
condition that led African governments to accept French leadership.  France, indeed, signed 
military cooperation accords with all of its Sub-Saharan colonies, except Guinea.11  These 
agreements’ military assistance clauses specified how France would help build ex-colonies’ 
                                                          
8 Olivier Feiertag, “La politique du franc CFA,” in Bat et al., Jacques Foccart: 
archives ouvertes, 287-308. 
9 Laurence Badel, “Les enjeux de la ‘francophonie économique’,” in Bat et al., 
Jacques Foccart: archives ouvertes, 323-340. 
10 Pierre-Michel Durand, L’Afrique et les relations franco-américaines des années 
1960 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009). 
11 Chester Crocker, “France’s Changing Military Interests: Evolution of the ‘most 
potent external military factor’ in contemporary Africa,” Africa Report (June 1968), 20. 
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national armies, including the provision of training and technical expertise.  The defense 
clauses, meanwhile, established procedures for France to intervene on its ex-colonies’ behalf.12   
De Gaulle planned, however, for France to fulfil these security commitments with 
utmost economy.  He intended to avoid being dragged into prolonged counterinsurgencies and 
told collaborators, “That’s enough with colonial wars.  We are having all the problems in the 
world extricating ourselves from the one in Algeria [1954-62] and I do not want to engage in 
a new one in black Africa.”13  De Gaulle therefore insisted that France’s African treaties not 
specify any level of support that France would automatically provide, leaving France’s 
President free to determine how to respond to each crisis.   
De Gaulle himself believed that France could uphold its commitments without 
expending significant military or political capital.  He envisaged that African armies, trained 
by France, would comprise the first line of defense and that France would only dispatch forces 
should those forces prove inadequate.  De Gaulle, therefore, ordered France’s military to build-
up African armies through the so-called “Raisonable” Plan.14  De Gaulle anticipated that, when 
they occurred, French interventions would be short and that France would withdraw once the 
menace abated.  De Gaulle was so confident of this that he ordered a massive redeployment of 
French military assets, reducing French forces in Sub-Saharan Africa from 60,000 personnel 
in 1960 to 6,600 in 1965.15 
                                                          
12 Robin Luckham, “Le militarisme francais en Afrique,” Politique africaine, 2/9 
(1982), 95-110 
13 Guia Migani, La France et l’Afrique sub-saharienne, 1957-1963 (Brussels: PIE 
Peter Lang, 2008), 135. 
14 Moshé Ammi-Oz, “La formation des cadres africains lors de la mise sur pied des 
armées nationales,” Revue française d’études politiques aficaines, 133 (1977), p. 84-97. 
15 Crocker, 24. 
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De Gaulle’s view that Africa should serve as a tool for bolstering France’s great power 
aspirations, yet was not a realm of geopolitical interest, is best exemplified by his decisions to 
centralize African policymaking within the Presidency, while neglecting Africa when it came 
to his personal diplomacy.  De Gaulle, for example, personally undertook three voyages to 
francophone Africa in 1958-59, when France was negotiating its post-colonial role, yet never 
visited the region again during his remaining nine years in power.  De Gaulle’s neglect of 
Africa appears even starker given his penchant for high-profile personal diplomacy.16   
While de Gaulle was less personally interested in Africa than other regions, he feared 
lest foreign powers undermine France’s hold over its ex-colonies.  He therefore appointed a 
close collaborator, Jacques Foccart, as his personal representative for Africa.  Africa, within 
this context, occupied a unique position in French policymaking.  Whereas France’s Foreign 
Ministry piloted foreign policies towards other continents, Africa policy was unique in being 
steered by a secretariat subordinated directly to the Presidency.  De Gaulle accomplished this 
institutionally by appointing Foccart director of the French Community’s vestigial secretariat.   
Although the Community’s institutional structures fell into desuetude after 1959, they 
remained embedded in the Fifth Republic’s Constitution.  This meant that de Gaulle was still 
theoretically the Community’s chief executive and could therefore form a secretariat to manage 
Community affairs.17  Foccart, in this capacity, controlled a staff of 150 and further relied on 
his close ties with Maurice Robert, French intelligence’s head of African affairs (Sector “N” 
                                                          
16 De Gaulle remained extremely dedicated to personal diplomacy after 1959, when he 
made his last voyage to francophone Africa.  From 1960 until 1969 he made the following 
diplomatic voyages: Western European allies (four trips), North America (four), Warsaw Pact 
(three), Near East and Eastern Mediterranean (three), Asia/Oceania (one), and South America 
(one). 
17 Geneste, 190-194. 
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of the SDECE).18  Foccart, furthermore, built extensive personal networks, hand-selecting 
France’s ambassadors to ex-colonies and pressuring African presidents to appoint Foccart 
loyalists to oversee their security services.      
Foccart’s primary qualifications for this role were his status as one of de Gaulle’s most 
trusted collaborators and his long-standing connection with France’s secret services.  During 
the Second World War, Foccart led a cell within France’s Resistance and later served in an 
inter-allied commando unit.19  Foccart thereafter dedicated himself to Gaullist politics, rising 
to become secretary general of the Gaullist Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF) in 1954.  
Upon assuming power as de Gaulle’s “Monsieur Afrique” in 1960, Foccart held less formal 
power than other Gaullist political “barons”, such as Michel Debré or Jacques Chaban-Delmas, 
but enjoyed more access to the President and met daily with de Gaulle.20 
It, thus, fell upon Foccart to implement de Gaulle’s vision for Africa.  Foccart, initially, 
achieved this objective with remarkable economy.  Foccart used French troops to ensure 
President Senghor’s bloodless victory over Prime Minister Mamadou Dia during Senegal’s 
post-independence struggle of 1960-62.  He then sent paratroopers to restore Gabon’s pro-
French President Léon M'ba to power, at the cost of one French soldier killed, after M’ba was 
toppled by a military coup in 1964.21  Although these initial interventions suggested that France 
could preserve its post-colonial order at little cost, other factors even then threatened to entrap 
France in costlier conflicts.    
                                                          
18 Roger Faligot et al., Histoire politique des services secrets français de la Seconde 
Guerre mondiale à nos jours (Paris: La Découverte, 2012), 225-42. 
19 Turpin, 39-76. 
20 Ibid, 185-226 
21 Ibid, 200-01. 
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The Entrapment Problématique 
De Gaulle’s vision of perpetuating French power at little cost encountered three 
dynamics that threatened to entrap it in costly counterinsurgencies.  Firstly, his own and 
preceding governments’ fragmentation of France’s two colonial federations gave rise to 
questionably viable states.  The Central African Republic, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger 
were all overly large, underpopulated and encompassed historically antagonistic ethnic groups.  
France then had difficulty avoiding entrapment in these states’ troubles because France’s more 
valuable ex-colonies viewed France’s fulfilment of its security obligations to these states as a 
litmus test for how it would respond to their appeals.  Much of France’s officer corps, finally, 
believed in large-scale, long-term counterinsurgency operations—known as the guerre 
revolutionnaire doctrine—inimical to de Gaulle’s preference for short, cheap interventions. 
French policy between 1956 and 1960 broke up France’s two colonial federations—the 
AEF and AOF—into twelve states.  The motives that drove decision-makers to favor this 
outcome differed substantially.  Houphouët-Boigny set France on this pathway, with the 1956 
Framework Law, because he wanted to prevent revenues from his native and affluent Côte 
d’Ivoire from being used to subsidize AOF’s poorer members.22  De Gaulle and Foccart later 
further fragmented the federations, but their rationale was that smaller states would be more 
sensitive to French influence.23   
Regardless of their motives, French leaders’ division of the federations meant that 
certain francophone states were questionably viable.  The Central African Republic, Chad, 
                                                          
22 Mel. 
23 Geneste. 
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Mali, Mauritania and Niger were all sparsely populated, economically underdeveloped and 
geographically large.  These long-neglected possessions faced immense governance 
challenges.  Amongst the world’s least densely populated states, four faced the additional 
challenge of being landlocked, which further impeded their development.24  Most also 
experienced fraught relations between such historically antagonist groups as nomads, 
pastoralists and farmers.25  Ethnic and religious cleavages, including the trans-Saharan slave 
trade’s legacy of Muslim/animist animosity, further destabilized them.   
De Gaulle’s confidence that the flexibility he had built into France’s defense accords 
would enable him to avoid unprofitable entanglements likewise proved misplaced.  The 
similarity of the agreements that France signed with its soon-to-be-independent colonies led 
the presidents of France’s more valuable allies—Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Madagascar 
and Congo-Brazzaville—to scrutinize how France upheld its obligations to less-valuable 
territories.  They reasoned that comparatively wealthy states could not count on France’s 
security guarantees if France’s government did not first demonstrate its credibility by honoring 
its commitments to poorer ex-colonies.26  In other words, would France intervene on behalf of 
Madagascar if it did not do so for the Central African Republic?     
Any refusal to intervene on behalf of an ex-colony would therefore undermine France’s 
alliance system’s overall solidity.  De Gaulle and Foccart learned this lesson in 1963 when 
                                                          
24 Population densities ranged in 1965 from 0.8 inhabitants/km2 (Mauritania) to 4.3 
(Mali), contrasting poorly with the Sub-Saharan mean of 10.1.  United Nations, Population 
Division (2017): World Population Prospects at: esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/DataQuery/ (accessed 
September 2017). 
25 Victor Azarya, Nomads and the State in Africa (Leiden: ASC, 1996), 69-88. 
26 On credible commitment challenges, see: Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence 
(New Haven: Yale UP, 1966), 35-91. 
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popular uprisings overthrew Conto-Brazzaville’s pro-French President Fulbert Youlou.27  
France’s failure to support Youlou during the three day revolt shocked African leaders.28  Their 
discomfiture drove de Gaulle to dispatch troops to one of France’s least valued ex-colonies, 
Mauritania, later that year to deter Morocco from pursuing irredentist claims.29  Civil strife in 
francophone Africa would, in the future, pose even greater dilemmas for France: either 
intervene in states where the costs exceeded the benefits or refrain from intervening and risk 
devaluing France’s alliance system.    
French leaders, furthermore, found their ability to limit interventions’ scope challenged 
by their military’s doctrinal preferences.  The French military had, over time, waged some of 
the world’s most complex counterinsurgencies.  French officers’ collective experience with 
this form of warfare spurred the development of a uniquely French “school” of 
counterinsurgency beginning in the 1840s.30  In its mid-20th century form, known as guerre 
révolutionnaire, the military’s counterinsurgency approach distinguished itself from foreign 
counterparts by its emphasis on employing control measures to isolate populations from 
insurgents, while simultaneously exterminating guerrillas with a combination of semi-static 
quadrillage deployments and active sweeps by insurgent-hunting units.  Although foreign 
observers lauded France’s counterinsurgency school, the doctrine’s resource intensiveness and 
political/military implications rendered it inimical to de Gaulle’s Africa policy.31  
                                                          
27 Jean-Pierre Bat, La fabrique des barbouzes: Histoire des réseaux Foccart en 
Afrique (Paris: Nouveau Monde, 2015), 295-354. 
28 Ibid, 295-401. 
29 Crocker, 24. 
30 Benjamin Brower, A Desert Named Peace: The Violence of France’s Empire in the 
Algerian Sahara (New York: Columbia UP, 2009), 27-89. 
31 Galula and Trinquier are the only non-UK/USA authors referenced in: The U.S. 
Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago: Chicago UP, 2007). 
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One of guerre révolutionnaire’s tenets was that populations are apolitical and can be 
separated from insurgents through control measures and psychological manipulation.  
Counterinsurgency theorist David Galula best summarized this mechanistic view of 
populations, writing, "In any case, whatever the cause, there will be an active minority for the 
cause, a neutral majority, and an active minority against the cause.  The technique of power 
consists of relying on the favorable minority in order to rally the neutral majority and to 
neutralize or eliminate the hostile minority."32   
France’s military had long nurtured a network of bureaux arabes for this purpose and 
created new institutions during the 1954-62 Algerian War to capitalize on insights drawn from 
applied crowd psychology and police states’ social control techniques.33  Roger Triquier, for 
example, designed the Urban Protection Dispositive (DPU) to compel Algerians to surveille 
one another.34  Charles Lacheroy, meanwhile, spearheaded the creation of psychological 
warfare staffs (the cinquièmes bureaux) and training institutions (the Centre for Training and 
Preparation in Counter-Guerrilla Warfare [CIPCG]).35   
While population-control institutions, such as these, limit insurgents’ ability to draw 
resources from a population, they do not destroy guerrilla bands.  Commanders considered this 
residual task to be an exceedingly resource intensive one that demanded both semi-static 
quadrillage troops and elite mobile forces.  Quadrillage or “gridding” employs semi-static 
forces to protect transportation arteries and population centers, thereby restricting guerrillas’ 
                                                          
32 Galula, 53. 
33 Martin Thomas, “Colonial States as Intelligence States,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies 28/6 (2005), 1033-60. 
34 Roger Trinquier, La guerre moderne (Paris: Economica, 2008, orig. 1961), 40-43. 
35 Tramor Quemeneur, “’La discipline jusque dans l’indiscipline’ La désobéissance de 
militaires français,” In Mohammed Harbi & Benjamin Stora, eds., La Guerre d’Algérie 
(Paris: Robert Laffont, 2004), 173-76. 
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freedom of movement.  France’s Army employed conscripts in tens and hundreds of thousands 
to this end during the Rif (1921-26) and Algerian (1954-62) Wars.  Indigenous paramilitaries, 
however, also proved essential because France’s metropole never provided enough 
manpower.36  France therefore raised bewildering varieties of local auxiliaries, including: 
spahis, goums, moghazenis, harkis, partisans, and GMPRs.37   
Although quadrillage troops denied rebels access to critical targets, experience taught 
commanders that destroying mobile guerrilla bands is exceptionally difficult.  They therefore 
developed lightweight, elite units—legionnaires, marines and paratroops—that employed 
cutting-edge means of transportation to pursue guerillas, including armored cars in Morocco, 
parachutes in Indochina, and helicopters in Algeria.  These units acquired mythic reputations 
within France’s Army.  Describing Foreign Legionnaires during the Riff War, one observer 
portrayed forces as "spending their entire time in the field under an iron discipline."38  
Enunciating his vision of a paratroop unit, General Marcel Bigeard enthused about, "An agile, 
light, feline and maneuverable battalion that possesses an unshakeable faith."39         
The guerre révolutionnaire doctrine was, in sum, the military establishment’s response 
to successive counterinsurgencies.  Most officers believed that this approach worked and had 
enabled Field Marshals Hubert Lyautey and Jospeh Gallieni to pacify restless colonies.40  Many 
also felt that guerre révolutionnaire had succeeded in Algeria, defeating the Front de Libération 
                                                          
36 Paul Ely, "Enseignements de la Guerre d’Indochine," In Rand Memorandum RM-
5271-PR (Santa Monica: Rand, 1967), 54-64. 
37 Christophe Cazorla, "Le concept d’emploi des supplétifs dans la guerre d’Algerie," 
Revue historique des armées 4 (2002), 69-82. 
38 H., "The Campaign in Morocco," Foreign Affairs 2/4 (1926). 
39 Marcel Bigeard, Pour une parcelle de gloire (Plon: Paris, 1975), 102.   
40 Jean Gottmann,”Bugeaud, Galliéni, Lyautey,” in Edward Earle ed., Makers of 
Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton: Princeton UP, 
1943), 234-259 
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Nationale (FLN), despite France’s ultimate withdrawal.  De Gaulle and other political leaders, 
however, regarded the doctrine as a threat to their control over interventions.  Guerre 
révolutionnaire, first and foremost, was gourmand of resources and time.  Troops were needed 
to spread a net of quadrillage, impose population controls, and hunt down guerrillas. 
Even worse from political leaders’ point of view were guerre révolutionnaire’s 
implications for civil-military relations.  French theorists argued that counterinsurgencies 
demanded a sagacious combination of political and military measures.  Gallieni, for instance, 
argued “pacification can best be achieved… through the combined impact of [military] force 
and political action.”41  Galula later built on Gallieni’s hypothesis and calculated that, "A 
revolutionary war is 20 per cent military and 80 per cent political."42  French counterinsurgency 
experts reasoned from this need for closely coordinated political and military measures that 
field commanders should assume broad political powers.  Lyautey, the pacifier of Morocco, 
forcefully expressed this belief when he argued, “The first act of any commanding general 
operating at 3,000 leagues [from France] should be to cut the telegraph wire to free himself 
from the metropole’s harassing instructions.”43 
This institutional norm of privileging commanders’ authority over governmental 
instructions rendered civilian control of counterinsurgencies problematic.44  The military’s 
reticence to obey governments climaxed during the 1954-62 Algerian War when officers 
attempted coups on two occasions and sabotaged government policies on many others.  Guerre 
                                                          
41 Joseph-Simon Gallieni, "Principes de Pacification et d’Organisation," In Maxime 
Gillet, Principes de Pacification du Maréchal Lyautey (Paris: Economica, 2010), 94. 
42 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport: 
Praeger, 2006, orig. 1964), 63. 
43 Gillet, 63. 
44 A.S. Kanya-Forstner, The Conquest of the Western Sahara (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 1969). 
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révolutionnaire theorists Antoine Argoud, Charles Lacheroy and Yves Godard played leading 
roles in this dissidence, leading de Gaulle to conclude that the doctrine itself undermined 
France’s government’s control over its military.45  De Gaulle therefore set about marginalizing 
guerre révolutionnaire.  He began, in 1960, by abolishing the CIPCG and went further after 
the failed 1961 coup by dismantling the cinquièmes bureaux and many elite insurgent-hunting 
units.  He ultimately aimed to “return the [French] Army to the Rhine” as a force 
overwhelmingly comprised of conscripts and focused on conventional warfare.46  
Guerre révolutionnaire remained deeply ingrained, nonetheless, in those units 
susceptible to intervene in Africa.  Institutions like the Center for African and Asian Studies 
(CEAA), which Lacheroy directed prior to his downfall, taught a generation of officers that 
guerre révolutionnaire provided a template for victory.47  Commanders then employed the 
doctrine’s intellectual repertoire in Africa during the Fifth Republic’s formative months.  
French forces, for example, drew on guerre révolutionnaire’s precepts to suppress Cameroon’s 
Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) in 1955-62.  They first imposed tight controls over 
Cameroon’s population, then raised paramilitary forces for quadrillage, and finally extirpated 
the UPC’s guerrilla bands.48  The French-directed “Écouvillon” campaign in the Western 
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Saharan, which mobilized 14,000 French and Spanish soldiers in 1958, likewise emulated 
France’s anti-guerrilla offensives in Algeria.49      
De Gaulle’s strategy for economically preserving France’s influence in Africa thus 
generated entrapment risks that de Gaulle himself did not appreciate.  At least five ex-colonies 
were structurally prone to internal conflicts, with few resources to govern vast territories filled 
with antagonistic groups.  Wealthier ex-colonies’ presidents’ tendency to judge French 
commitments’ value based on how France responded to crises in poorer ex-colonies made it 
difficult for France to avoid entrapment in civil wars.  The guerre révolutionnaire doctrine, 
furthermore, complicated political leaders’ efforts to manage their interventions.     
 
Origins of the Chadian Quagmire 
Chad’s insurgency would, beginning in the mid-1960s, pose the first major challenge 
to France’s post-colonial order in Africa.  Chad, like certain other ex-colonies, had few 
economic endowments with which to govern immense, underpopulated territories.  Chad’s 
ethnic composition posed additional challenges due to the animus between southern 
Christian/animist and northern Muslim ethnic groups.  Chad’s first President, François 
Tombalbye, aggravated these problems through policies of ethnic favoritism towards his own 
Sara ethnic group.  A vicious cycle of governmental repression and opposition mobilization 
ensued from 1963 onwards, bringing the government to the brink of collapse in 1968.     
Although Chad first confronted French policymakers with the entrapment 
problématique, other ex-colonies might have posed this challenge sooner.  Touareg tribesmen 
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from Kidal Province led the way in contesting a francophone government’s sovereignty.  They 
rejected the Malian government’s authority in 1960 and President Modiba Keita’s subsequent 
invasion of Kidal precipitated a short, yet bloody counterinsurgency in 1963-64.50  Niger then 
experienced its own insurgency when partisans of the Sawaba movement embraced guerrilla 
warfare in 1964-65.51  Neither of these rebellions, however, required France to intervene since 
national armies, equipped with French arms and directed by French advisors, quelled them. 
It was Chad, therefore, that first generated the degree of strife necessary to entrap 
France.  The competing French, Anglo-Egyptian and Italian imperialisms that gave rise to 
Chad’s borders endowed the state with three distinct populations—Christian/animist farmers, 
Muslim farmers and Muslim nomads—each of which contains numerous tribes.52  Each 
Chadian group also nurtures cross-border ties with neighboring states.  The Christian/animist 
Sara of southern Chad, for example, are both Chad’s largest group and are also prominent in 
the Central African Republic.  Chad’s second largest group, the Arabs of eastern Chad, are 
historically connected to co-ethnics in Sudan.53  Finally, the Tubus that dominate northern Chad 
are linked to Libya’s Fezzane Province.54  Chad’s ethnic groups’ pre-colonial interactions were 
often antagonistic, with nomads raiding farmers and Muslims enslaving animists.    
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Chad’s meagre resources aggravated its ethnic dynamics by depriving its government 
of the wherewithal to build a modern state.  French administrators had struggled to eke out 
funds from Chad and the colony’s budget ran chronic deficits despite the use of forced labor to 
cultivate cotton.  Although France’s treasury covered these deficits while Chad was a colony, 
independence gave rise to an insolvent state.  Chad’s government, indeed, ran a deficit of 2.6 
billion CFA for a budget of 6 billion CFA during Chad’s first year of independence.55  Chad’s 
foremost exports, cotton (70% of exports) and cattle (15% of exports), were also of such a 
nature that the government could do little to swiftly expand their output.56 
Chad’s endowments’ geographic distribution proved even more problematic than their 
absolute levels.  France had concentrated its investments in cotton-producing southern 
provinces, building more schools and roads there than in Chad’s northern two-thirds.  
Independence brought to power a scion of southern Chad’s dominant Sara tribe, François 
Tombalbye.  Tombalbye, in turn, exacerbated Chad’s inequalities by favoring his ethnicity and 
province.  He insisted, for example, on building Chad’s largest meat-packing facility in his 
home province rather than the Sahelian regions that raised most Chadian cattle.57  He also 
diverted European Economic Community funds allocated for improving central Chad’s cattle 
stock to southern Chad’s cotton sector.58  Tombalbye, all-the-while, promoted Sara officers 
over their Muslim Hadjarai counterparts to better control the armed forces.59   
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These discriminatory policies fostered an explosive political climate.  Muslims within 
Tombalbye’s political party publicly appealed to the President in March 1963 to remedy 
matters by forming an ethnically-inclusive cabinet.  Tombalbye, however, felt threatened by 
this implied criticism and ordered his police to arrest the Muslim politicians.60  Rumors that 
the government would soon arrest another prominent Muslim, Djibrine Kherallah, then 
catalyzed demonstrations around Kherallah’s house.  The crowd gathering around Kherallah 
alarmed Tombalbye, who ordered his security forces to disperse the protestors.  The collision 
between Tombalbye’s gendarmes and pro-Kherallah demonstrators on 16 September 1963 
resulted in the deaths of over 20 demonstrators.61  
Muslims’ growing sense of oppression spurred them to plot.  The climate of repression 
within Chad meant, however, that this scheming occurred amongst the diaspora.  Chadian 
expatriates in Sudan, for example, formed the Mouvement National pour la Liberation du 
Tchad in 1963 and sent volunteers to Algeria for guerrilla warfare training.62  The Cairo-based 
militant Ibrahim Abatcha, meanwhile, nurtured ties with North Vietnam and sent seven 
volunteers to North Korea for training.  A third group, operating in the Central African 
Republic, also planned to send militants to Algeria, but instead improvised a training camp 
within Chad after the 1965 Algerian coup disrupted that project.63 
It was not these plots, however, that tipped Chad into civil war, but rather Tombalbye’s 
efforts to redress Chad’s balance of payment problems.  Tombalbye decided in late-1964 to 
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raise taxes to cover the government’s operating expenses, while simultaneously extracting a 
mandatory loan to pay for development projects.64  Despite Tombalbye’s plan’s apparent logic, 
the new financial burden exceeded communities’ ability to pay.  The government, for example, 
sought to collect 12 million CFA from Malgalmé District’s Moubi tribe in 1965, compared to 
only 3 million CFA the previous year.65  The Moubi, in this instance, refused to pay and 
Tombalbye dispatched his Interior Minister and gendarmes to extort the funds.  Events in 
Mangalmé thereafter spiraled out of control, with gendarmes firing on protestors, who 
retaliated by massacring government officials.66      
The revolt that started in Mangalmé spread as travelers carried word of the 
government’s brutality.67  To make matters worse, a sub-prefect’s insolence towards the Tubus’ 
leader, the Derdeï, soured relations between the government and northern Chad’s nomads.68  
The foreign-based dissident groups recognized the opportunity these events provided and 
cooperated to transform Chad’s anti-regime violence into a full-fledged insurgency.  Their 
representatives converged on Kassal-Rou-Ouss in Darfur to create a joint command structure, 
form a guerrilla unit of 150 fighters, and found the Front de Liberation Nationale du Tchad 
(FROLINAT) as their umbrella group.69 
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FROLINAT’s progressive and Muslim nature attracted support from Sudan, Egypt and 
Algeria once the organization began launching attacks in 1966.70  FROLINAT consciously 
emulated Algerian and Vietnamese revolutionaries by assassinating government 
administrators.71  Chad’s 3,000 military personnel responded to this violence with scorched 
earth tactics, burning villages, slaughtering livestock and executing suspects.  These exactions, 
however, drove more Chadians to join FROLINAT, igniting a cycle whereby rebellion 
prompted repression, which reinforced the rebellion.72 
Tombalbye’s regime lost control of rural central Chad in 1967.  The Tubus then revolted 
as well, overthrowing public authority in northern Chad and besieging the government’s base 
in Aozou.73 By mid-1968 only Tombalbye’s ethnic base in southern Chad remained loyal.  The 
government’s ability to hold even this remnant was, meanwhile, threatened by Chad’s 
catastrophic finances.  Chad’s government spent more money because of the war, but collected 
fewer taxes because guerrillas disrupted the cotton harvest and controlled the countryside.  
Chad’s trade deficit consequently skyrocketed from 7 billion CFA in 1965 to 18 billion in 
1968.74  Chad’s government, in sum, was losing the countryside and going bankrupt. 
 
Entrapment 
French officials observed Chad’s descent into anarchy with growing apprehension.  
Tombalbye’s soldiers’ brutality first elicited protests from France’s intelligence director in 
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Chad, Major Mallet.  Tombalbye, however, responded angrily to Mallet’s criticism, driving the 
latter leave Chad.75  Tombalbye subsequently began demanding increased assistance.  French 
refusals to provide this aid, combined with French Ambassador Guy de Commines’ private 
criticism of Tombalbye’s policies further damaged relations between France’s embassy and 
Chad.76  Much of France’s foreign policymaking bureaucracy agreed with Commines and 
regarded Tombalbye as unworthy of additional assistance. 
Tombalbye retaliated for this French stinginess by openly threatening France’s African 
sphere of influence.77  He began by seeking other powers’ assistance to demonstrate to French 
leaders that they should not take France’s privileged position for granted.  Tombalbye initially 
requested American aid in 1966.  The United States, however, declined to supplant France and 
provided only $167,000.78  American disinterest prompted Tombalbye to seek Soviet 
assistance.79  Tombalbye’s demarches to Moscow progressed from sending envoys to a state 
visit in June 1968, whose results were equally disappointing for Tombalbye, who received only 
promises of “cultural” cooperation.     
The superpowers’ disinterest led Tombalbye to court other partners.  Congo-Kinshasa’s 
President, Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, provided one such opportunity and Tombalbye joined with 
Mobutu in February 1968 to promote a Congolese-led Union of Central African States (UEAC) 
as an alternative to the pro-French Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa 
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(UDEAC).80  De Gaulle’s advisor for African affairs, Foccart, considered this UEAC proposal 
a threat to French interests and intrigued against it.81  Tombalbye reinforced Foccart’s 
apprehensions during his speech on UEAC by threatening to revoke the French ambassador’s 
honorific role as the doyen of the diplomatic corps resident in Chad.82  
France’s success scuttling the UEAC failed, however, to discourage Tombalbye’s quest 
for alternative alliances.  Arab states’ support for FROLINAT persuaded Tombalbye to ally 
with Israel.  Tombalbye visited Israel in 1962 and 1965, and he supported Israel diplomatically 
at the United Nations following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.83  Israeli leaders did little, however, 
to reciprocate Tombalbye’s gestures until June 1968, when Israel began arming Sudan’s Anya-
Nya guerrillas.84  Mobutu encouraged these arms transfers, but limited Congo-Kinshasa’s 
direct involvement.85  Mobutu and the Israelis consequently proposed to Tombalbye that Israeli 
instructors, based in Congo-Kinshasa, would train and equip elite Chadian parachutist-
commando units in exchange for Israel using Chadian territory to ship Anya-Nya arms.86 
Tombalbye’s acrimonious relations with France, combined with the deteriorating 
situation in Chad, alarmed those decision-makers who felt most invested in France’s continuing 
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role in Africa.  Francophone leaders were particularly concerned that France was providing 
Chad inadequate military assistance.  Madagascar’s President Philibert Tsiranana told Paris 
repeatedly that the credibility of France’s security guarantees would suffer if it failed to aid 
Tombalbye.87  Niger’s President Hamani Diori, meanwhile, took it upon himself to mediate 
between Tombalbye and Paris.88  
Foccart regarded these developments as a threat to France’s international position.  He 
began arguing in 1967 that, “Soon we will have to take responsibility for this situation [in 
Chad] if we want to prevent matters from becoming increasingly toxic.”89  Foccart predicted 
that African leaders would blame France and lose faith in its security guarantees if rebels 
defeated Tombalbye.  Foccart regarded the alternative, of Tombalbye retaining power with 
other powers’ assistance, as even bleaker since it would encourage ex-colonies to shift their 
allegiances.  Foccart’s mistaken belief that American policymakers actively encouraged Israel 
and Congo-Kinshasa heightened these concerns.90 
Foccart was initially isolated within France’s government in advocating for greater 
involvement.  To build broader support, Foccart persuaded de Gaulle to send a military mission, 
led by General Coste, to evaluate whether Chad’s insurgents benefitted from outside support.  
Coste’s finding, that foreign powers were indeed subverting Chad, rendered non-intervention 
problematic since Franco-African defense accords specified that France would support its allies 
against external threats.91  Foccart next, in January 1968, lobbied de Gaulle to appoint a special 
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ambassador.92  Foccart’s choice for this sensitive mission fell on his close collaborator, Fernand 
Wibaux.  Wibaux, like Foccart, had joined the French Resistance early and he had already 
represented France in Mali during that state’s repression of its Touareg minority.  De Gaulle 
himself feared that Chadian instability could undermine France’s position in Africa and 
counselled Wibaux that, “Chad constitutes a section of one wall in our [African] edifice.  It is 
a rotten section of wall, but one that must be kept upright.”93 
The Tubus’ siege of the Chadian Army post at Aozou was all-the-while posing an 
increasingly acute problem.  Two Chadian Army expeditions to relieve the garrison failed and 
Tombalbye faced the imminent prospect of this force capitulating.  Tombalbye therefore 
brought matters to a head on 25 August 1968 by invoking the 1960 Franco-Chadian Defense 
Treaty.94  This request then sparked spirited debate in Paris.   
Foccart emphatically claimed that non-intervention would undermine France’s 
influence because “all of the African heads of state with whom we have accords are scrutinizing 
this case.”95  France’s military and Finance Ministry, meanwhile, advanced arguments against 
intervening.  Chief of Staff General Michel Fourquet warned that France’s Army would fail to 
reestablish security because of Chad’s size and ethnic composition.96  Finance Minister Antoine 
Pinay, for his part, cautioned that intervening would cost France’s budget dearly, while 
stabilizing Chad would bring France few economic benefits.97 
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It was de Gaulle who personally adjudicated between these recommendations.  He 
decreed that France would intervene militarily, but limit its intervention to lifting the siege of 
Aozou.  De Gaulle hoped that this short, sharp action would reverse Tombalbye’s decline, just 
as prior small interventions had resolved crises in Mauritania (1962) and Gabon (1964).  His 
instructions specified, “Our intervention will have a limited duration and we cannot envision 
stationing our forces permanently in Tibesti.”98  Foccart argued that such a small intervention 
would accomplish its objectives because, “It [the intervention] can have a deterrent effect on 
the rebels, not only in Tibesti, but also throughout other Chadian regions.”99   
De Gaulle’s Aozou expedition initially fulfilled his expectations.  France’s Air Force 
airlifted two paratrooper companies and deployed attack aircraft to northern Chad.  The return 
of the former colonizer’s army intimidated the rebels, who never opposed their advance.  Such 
swift action had immediate effects.  Foccart observed that, “The promptitude with which we 
responded to his request had a considerable psychological effect on Mr. Tombalbye; he 
believes that our intervention will demoralize the rebellion.”100  Foccart further observed that, 
at the international level, the intervention, “received a lot of attention from the media…. 
Amongst our African friends, Mr. Tsiranana expressed his satisfaction to our ambassador.”101 
French satisfaction with the expedition proved short lived however.  The Chadian 
garrison at Aozou abandoned their post as soon as they could physically leave after French 
paratroops had lifted the siege.102  This act of military indiscipline emboldened rebels 
throughout Chad.  Rebel ranks soon swelled to 2,330 personnel who launched 227 attacks 
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during the first half of 1969.103  Rebel forces with soaring morale began defeating Chadian 
forces in conventional engagements, repulsing the government’s “Mokofi” offensive in 
January 1969 and annihilating a quarter of Chad’s gendarmerie in March.104 
Chad’s armed forces’ disintegration in the aftermath of France’s Aozou expedition 
forced policymakers to contemplate a larger intervention.  De Gaulle himself lamented that 
“The inexistence of the Chadian Army is truly deplorable…. Are our military advisors doing 
their job?”105  General Frédéric Guinot, tasked by Foccart with assessing affairs in Chad, then 
counselled in mid-October 1968 that “only a more generalized intervention by French forces 
can resolve this situation.”106  Objections from both Yvon Bourges, France’s Secretary of State 
for Cooperation, and General Fourquet gave de Gaulle reason for pause however.107  When de 
Gaulle sought further advice from General Louis Dio, the Army’s Inspector General, the latter 
warned him that France “should never set foot in Chad again.”108   
The arguments against intervening were clear.  Tombalbye’s regime was collapsing due 
to its own mismanagement and coming to its rescue could embroil France in a prolonged 
conflict.  It was, therefore, with considerable fatalism that de Gaulle ordered his government 
to prepare a new, longer intervention.  By this point, French intelligence was predicting that 
Tombalbye would otherwise fall within several months.109  De Gaulle reasoned that, “There is 
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no substitute for Tombalbye.  Chad will break into two or several morsels if he disappears.”110  
De Gaulle, however, still hoped that France could swiftly redress the situation and predicted 
that, “We will thump them [the rebels] several times and this will create conditions for our 
civilian advisors to put Chad’s administration back on its feet.”111   
It was, thus, on 18 March 1969 that de Gaulle committed French soldiers to battle for 
the last time in his career.  For a nationalist, such as de Gaulle, to intervene in Chad was 
superficially irrational.  France would deploy its military into a geographically harsh 
environment, where France had few economic interests.  French leaders, however, were 
entrapped into intervening because non-intervention would have discredited France’s post-
colonial institutions in other African leaders’ eyes.  De Gaulle’s last war thus became the first 
war fought on behalf of France’s post-colonial sphere of influence.  
 
The Guerre Révolutionnaire Redux  
De Gaulle’s decision to intervene committed France to restoring the Chadian 
government’s authority over a country twice as large as France, where insurgents ruled over 
the hinterland.  To make matters worse, Chad’s rebels received sanctuary in two neighboring 
countries: Sudan and Libya.  What then was the French government’s plan and how large a 
commitment it was prepared to make to Chad?  De Gaulle himself never resolved these issues 
and he left France’s government rudderless, six weeks after agreeing to intervene, when he 
resigned the presidency on 28 April 1969. 
De Gaulle’s major contribution in shaping France’s intervention was his determination 
that civilian leaders should manage the war.  As the Army’s internal study put it, “The [military] 
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commander of the intervention was not… a proconsul in the way commanders in Hanoi and 
Algiers had been….  Although he retained some autonomy… it was nothing compared to that 
enjoyed by his predecessors during past wars.”112  De Gaulle achieved this objective by 
dividing authority between two bodies: combat forces under a Military Delegation (DM) and a 
civilian-run Mission for Administrative Reform (MRA).  Although the DM controlled regular 
military units, the MRA had the broad remit of reforming rural governance, re-empowering 
traditional rulers and building paramilitary forces.113  De Gaulle subordinated both the DM and 
MRA to Ambassador Wibaux, who became France’s de facto proconsul.114    
Reducing the military’s institutional authority over the intervention was not enough and 
France’s government also handpicked its commanders.  One of France’s most distinguished 
soldiers, General Marcel Bigeard, had already been promised command of African 
operations.115  Foccart and his colleagues, however, considered Bigeard a liability because of 
his relationship with France’s media, bordering on star power, and his close association with 
the guerre révolutionnaire doctrine.116  France’s cabinet, therefore, handpicked another officer, 
Brigadier-General Michel Arnaud.  Although Arnaud had also imbibed guerre révolutionnaire 
during the Algerian War, his prior deference to authority and experience with France’s colonial 
army led many to consider him ideal for Chad. 
The government’s solicitude about command arrangements was not, however, matched 
by an equivalent focus on strategy.  France’s Army, indeed, struggled to assemble personnel 
for the intervention because de Gaulle had abolished most of the Army’s professional 
                                                          
112 IMFT, 362. 
113 SHD 11S140 Activité de la M.R.A., 16 June 1969. 
114 Interview with Fernand Wibaux, February 18, 2005. 
115 SHD 11S130 Mémoires (Cortadellas), 6-7.  
116 Foccart, Journal de l’Elysée – II, 647. 
32 
 
battalions, yet refused to employ conscripts in Chad.  The French contingent therefore only 
reached 1,390 personnel by mid-1969, of which 260 professional Foreign Legion paratroops 
constituted Arnaud’s strike force, while 290 French cadres trained and led Chadian soldiers.117 
Arnaud initially deployed his two paratroop companies to Chad’s rebel-controlled 
Guera province.  The rebels, for their part, were unaccustomed to well-trained opponents and 
erred by attacking the legionnaires, who comprehensively defeated them between 24 and 29 
April.118  These victories chastened central Chad’s insurgents, who began to eschew contact.  
The rebels’ decision not to fight confronted Arnaud with a conundrum.  While his Foreign 
Legion companies could defeat any rebels they found, these units could only control a zone 
with a radius of 100km.  Arnaud’s staff assembled a detailed appreciation of the insurgency, 
based on prisoner interrogations, and estimated the guerrillas’ strength, exclusive of the Tubus, 
at 2,000.119  These insurgents were numerous enough to control Chad’s countryside so long as 
they shunned contact with French forces. 
Arnaud drew on guerre révolutionnaire’s recipes to rectify this state-of-affairs.  He 
requested that Paris triple the elite French infantry and increase the number of helicopters under 
his command.120  This, Arnaud hoped, would provide him with the mobile forces needed to 
hunt guerrilla bands.  Arnaud, meanwhile, demanded the right to raise paramilitary forces for 
the personnel-intensive practice of quadrillage.121  Arnaud, third and finally, proposed to 
withdraw Chadian garrisons from two provinces—Ennedi and Tibesti—to use them to 
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reestablish control of central Chad.122  Arnaud cautioned, even as he made these proposals, that 
he would need five years to suppress Chad’s insurgency. 
Arnaud’s demands sent shockwaves through both Paris and Chad’s capital, Fort-Lamy.  
Arnaud’s prediction of a large, prolonged war alarmed French policymakers, who had hoped 
to unobtrusively wrap up the intervention.  France’s Defense Minister therefore dispatched 
another General, Edmond Magendie, to provide a second opinion.123  Arnaud’s plans, 
meanwhile, generated additional controversy in Fort-Lamy.  Tombalbye opposed any 
withdrawal of garrisons.124  Pierre Lami, the MRA’s director, argued meanwhile that 
paramilitary forces should remain within his purview, rather than being assigned to the DM.125            
The controversy surrounding Arnaud’s plans dominated the summer of 1969.  
Magendie’s inquest, conducted in July, found in favor of Arnaud.  Arnaud’s unilateral decision 
to withdraw the garrison of Ounianga Kébir, as a first step towards withdrawing the garrisons 
from Ennedi and Tibesti, then outraged Tombalbye.126  Relations between Arnaud and 
Tombalbye thenceforth deteriorated, with Arnaud also opposing Chadian officers’ exactions, 
such as burning rebel villages, which Tombalbye had sanctioned.  Matters came to a head in 
August 1969 when Tombalbye advocated massacring 15,000 pro-FROLINAT villagers, 
provoking Arnaud into upbraiding him in front of his officers.127 
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France’s new President, Georges Pompidou, chose to relieve Arnaud on 8 August 
1969.128  Arnaud’s advocacy of a lengthy counterinsurgency worried policymakers in Paris and 
his acrimonious relationships with his colleagues in Fort-Lamy made his retention problematic.  
Arnaud’s recommendations, however, were consistent with both France’s counterinsurgency 
doctrine and the intelligence at his disposal.  The armed forces’ investigation concluded as 
much, finding Arnaud’s judgement irreproachable.129  Arnaud was thus relieved not because 
he had failed to develop a suitable plan, but because political leaders refused to provide Arnaud 
with the means or the authority to implement it. 
 
Fighting and Negotiating 
France’s government appointed Brigadier-General Edouard Cortadellas to succeed 
Arnaud in September 1969.  Cortadellas, like Arnaud, had extensive colonial experience and 
had commanded troops in Indochina, Morocco, Senegal and Algeria.130  Although Cortadellas 
was known for being forthright, bordering on abrasive, he was chastened by the conditions of 
his appointment.  Since Arnaud had been undone by his advocacy of a prolonged effort and his 
turf battles with the MRA, Cortadellas sought to avoid such problems.  This meant, in practice, 
that Cortadellas limited his goals to degrading Chad’s insurgency to whatever degree French 
policymakers considered consistent with their political objectives. 
Cortadellas sought to distinguish his approach from both his predecessor’s and from 
earlier counterinsurgencies.  His first order banned the use of terms borrowed from prior 
campaigns, such as fellaghas, ratissage and the bled.131  With this act, Cortadellas symbolically 
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differentiated operations in Chad from the Algerian War and the guerre révolutionnaire 
doctrine.  Cortadellas also proposed creating two institutions: a civil-military general staff to 
promote cooperation between the DM and MRA and a Franco-Chadian General Staff to 
improve inter-military collaboration.132  Cortadellas hoped these bodies would mitigate the 
inter-organizational discord that had plagued Arnaud’s tenure. 
While Cortadellas sought to avoid Arnaud’s mistakes, he faced the same structural 
challenges.  French and Chadian forces were too small to pacify a meaningful portion of Chad.  
Cortadellas, therefore, echoed his predecessor’s reinforcement requests.  Wibaux, however, 
now agreed with Cortadellas’ assessment and urged Foccart to fulfill his requirements.133  
France’s government therefore, albeit reluctantly, provided reinforcements.  French forces in 
Chad consequently doubled, reaching 2,851 personnel with 34 aircraft by late-1969.134  France, 
meanwhile, also provided money and equipment to expand Chad’s army from 1,900 to 4,300 
personnel.135  Wibaux and Cortadellas replaced Chadian commanders, whom they considered 
unqualified, with 610 French cadres, sending the Chadians to a two-year training program.136  
Providing these additional troops forced France’s government to revisit a core post-
Algeria policy.  De Gaulle had championed restructuring the Army into a conscript-based force 
focused on deterring the Soviet Union and he consequently dissolved professional infantry 
units, with the exception of a handful of Foreign Legion battalions.  Now the Chadian War was 
overstretching these meager forces.  The Defense Ministry, therefore, ordered the Army in late-
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1969 to professionalize two 3rd Marine Infantry Regiment (RIMa) companies and a paratroop 
company already stationed in Africa.137  Cortadellas’ demands for more troops led the Ministry 
to expand this professionalization drive in March 1970 to include the entire 3rd RIMa.138   
Cortadellas’ employment of his expanding forces differed little from Arnaud’s concept.  
Simply put, French forces would clear an area of insurgents, after which Chadian forces would 
deploy and the MRA would establish paramilitary militias.  These lower-quality quadrillage 
forces would then prevent insurgents from returning to the area while the MRA reinstalled 
traditional rulers and reformed local administration.  French authorities hoped to pacify 
Chadian regions one-by-one in this way, starting with economically-productive regions near 
Fort-Lamy and then shifting to more peripheral regions.139 
Cortadellas began by launching offensives in Guera, Chari Baguirmi, Ouaddaï and 
Salamat provinces between October 1969 and June 1970.140  Even though Cortadellas lacked 
authority over paramilitary forces, he achieved a high enough degree of cooperation with the 
MRA that the latter established 60 militias and reinstalled the Sultans of Ouaddaï and Sila in 
Cortadellas’ offensives’ wake.141  Having distributed 2,410 firearms to paramilitary forces, 
more Chadians were now fighting with the French than against them.142  As soon as 
paramilitary forces detected rebels, horse-mounted paramilitaries and motorized Chadian units 
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converged on them.  Franco-Chadian forces decimated one rebel band after another in this 
manner, tentatively pacifying central Chad by July 1970.143 
Pompidou’s government welcomed Cortadellas’ achievements as a means for 
extricating France from Chad.  Secretary of State Bourges announced on 26 May 1970 that 
France would complete Chad’s pacification and withdraw by July 1971.144  This declaration 
assuaged France’s increasingly skeptical public.  Jacques Isnard’s editorials in le Monde had 
criticized France’s intervention since September 1969 and Socialist politician François 
Mitterrand condemned the intervention from the Senate’s floor in November.145  France’s 
government’s eagerness to disengage outpaced, however, its accomplishments on the ground.  
This became apparent as Cortadellas’ efforts shifted northwards, where Tubu insurgents 
benefitted from better weaponry and rougher geography.   
Cortadellas confronted the Tubu rebellion in March 1970 when he ordered French 
paratroops to reoccupy Ounianga Kébir.  Tombalbye remained bitter over Arnaud’s withdrawal 
from this post and Wibaux hoped that retaking it would bolster Tombalbye’s faith in France.146  
It was, thus, political, rather than military, factors that drove the operation.  The Tubu guerrillas, 
for their part, fled when French forces advanced on 23 March.  The ease of re-taking this post 
did not, however, mean that France had cowed the Tubus.  The rebels, instead, organized 
ambushes along roads surrounding the outpost.  French paratroops then blundered into three 
engagements between 25 and 30 March.  The paratroops’ ability to radio for attack aircraft 
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gave them the edge each time, but the Tubus inflicted more casualties—7 dead and 10 
wounded—than France had hitherto suffered.147 
The rebels’ comparative success around Ounianga Kébir emboldened Muammar 
Gaddafi’s new regime to escalate Libya’s involvement during the summer of 1970.  He began 
by arming 150 Chadian expatriates whom he had compelled to join FROLINAT and then, more 
importantly, obliged 600 Tubu veterans of Libya’s recently-abolished Royal Guard to join their 
kinsmen in Chad.148  Gaddafi’s infusions of fresh blood and armaments transformed the 
struggle in northern Chad, which was previously limited to 400 poorly-armed rebels.149 
The emboldened Tubus then launched four offensives, against Fada, Zoui, Bedo and 
Zouar.  While the Tubus failed at Zoui and Fada, they won psychological victories at Zouar 
and Bedo.  Rebels defeated a Chadian unit near Zouar in June and then blockaded Zouar in 
September.150  Slightly thereafter, on 11 October, another Tubu band ambushed French 
paratroops, killing 12 and wounding 15.151  Coming in quick succession, these reverses stunned 
French policymakers.  Cortadellas admitted that, "The situation is entirely new and extremely 
grave.  I no longer possess either the numeric superiority, firepower advantage or mobility to 
deal with more than one trouble spot….  I have lost the initiative and can only react."152 
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These reverses revived questions about France’s conduct of the war.  Cortadellas 
launched the debate by appealing for more soldiers and helicopters.153  Wibaux supported 
Cortadellas, but aimed to accomplish the limited objective of coercing the Tubu into 
negotiating, rather than achieving victory.154  Other decision-makers, however, pressed for an 
earlier withdrawal.  Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann argued that greater efforts would only 
mire France in Chad’s quagmire.155  Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas, meanwhile, claimed that 
France had supported Tombalbye long enough and should disengage.  Foccart parried these 
arguments by claiming that Tombalbye’s fall, following France’s withdrawal, would drive 
Niger and Cameroon to abrogate their treaties with France.  President Pompidou sided with 
Foccart and ordered his government to dispatch reinforcements.156     
French reinforcements consequently streamed into Chad for two months in preparation 
for France’s largest offensive yet, code-named Bison.  Cortadellas planned to use 1,250 soldiers 
(900 French and 350 Chadian), 150 vehicles, 18 helicopters, eight attack aircraft and 1,600,000 
liters of fuel to crush the Tubus beginning on 10 January 1971.157  Operation Bison’s very size 
backfired, however, by convincing the rebels to hide rather than fight, which denied France 
any notable accomplishments.  During the offensive’s first phase (Bison Alpha), the targeted 
band (150 combatants) escaped detection.  During the next phase (Bison Bravo), French forces 
located 20 rebels, but suffered two dead and five wounded in their haste to engage them.158 
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The Tubu‘s leader, the Derdeï, then sowed dissention amongst French policymakers by 
offering to negotiate provided that France agree to a ceasefire.  Cortadellas emphatically 
opposed this proposition, arguing that he would defeat the Tubus if given more time.  Wibaux 
supported Cortadellas because he feared that the Derdeï’s offer was a ruse.159  Schumann and 
Bourges, however, urged Pompidou to accept the proposal, which the latter did by decreeing a 
negotiating pause on 12 February.160 
Subsequent events proved Cortadellas and Wibaux correct.  The Derdeï dragged talks 
out to enable his rebels to flee into the mountains and then broke negotiations off once they 
were safe.  French forces then failed to locate any rebels when they renewed their offensive.161  
France’s largest offensive consequently failed after neutralizing only 16 Tubu rebels out of a 
thousand.162  France’s heavy consumption of materiel—including 2,400,000 liters of fuel and 
motor vehicles worn until they needed replacement—meanwhile left French forces unable to 
conduct high intensity operations.163   
Worse than the offensive’s material effects was the consternation it sowed amongst 
French policymakers.  Bourges’ announcement in May 1970 that France would withdraw 
fourteen months hence, having accomplished its mission, rang hollow after France’s setbacks 
in late-1970 and early-1971.  This raised, once again, the question of how to terminate an 
unpopular intervention.     
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Strategic Satisficing 
The Tubu attacks of late-1970 and France’s failure to quell them in early-1971 posed a 
dilemma.  Pompidou had committed to withdrawing from Chad in July 1971, but disengaging 
after military setbacks would convey the impression that France had failed.  Prime Minister 
Chaban-Delmas and Foreign Minister Schumann nevertheless argued for withdrawing on 
schedule.164  Neither thought that intervening had been worthwhile in the first place and both 
feared the publicity that came with the uptake in losses.  Wibaux contended, from Fort-Lamy, 
that Tombalbye would fall if France withdrew precipitously.  Foccart, in Paris, added that 
African leaders would then blame France for failing to uphold its commitments.  Pompidou 
hesitated and then decreed that he would prolong France’s intervention until August 1972, and 
then withdraw before campaigning began for France’s March 1973 legislative elections.165 
This governmental decision forced Wibaux and Cortadellas to rethink their strategy.  
They understood that France could neither comprehensively defeat Chad’s insurgents nor 
extend the government’s control over Chad’s territory in the allotted time.  They also nurtured 
few illusions, as previously the case, about coercing the Derdeï into ending the Tubu rebellion.  
Victory, in other words, was no longer an option.  They therefore focused on achieving France’s 
minimal objectives within the time remaining.  To draw an economic analogy, Wibaux’s and 
Cortadellas’ paradigm shifted from optimizing to satisficing. 
Strategic satisficing, within Chad’s context, meant creating a state-of-affairs whereby 
Chad’s rebels could not swiftly conquer power after France’s withdrawal.  Wibaux and 
Cortadellas consequently focused on consolidating Tombalbye’s control over the territories 
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they termed la tchad utile (useful Chad).166  Wibaux had concluded, after months of observing 
Cortadellas’ operations, that northern Chad was economically valueless and its inhabitants 
unconquerable.167  He therefore persuaded Cortadellas to abandon northern Chad, with the 
exception of four symbolic garrisons. 
Wibaux calculated that Tombalbye could afford to relinquish northern Chad, but needed 
to retain central Chad, which was much more populous and productive.  Intelligence, moreover, 
indicated that Libya planned to reinvigorate the rebellion in central Chad.  Wibaux 
consequently redeployed the DM’s and the MRA’s resources to this region.  He and Cortadellas 
thereafter focused on how to crush FROLINAT’s anticipated offensive and deprive central 
Chad’s insurgents of their sanctuaries in Sudan.  
The MRA secured the central Chadian peasantry’s neutrality by drilling 146 village 
wells and building 21 schools.168  The MRA went further in supportive locales, establishing 
100 militias by late-1971.169  France’s combination of attractive development projects and 
dissuasive military power convinced 400 rebels of the Moubi ethnic group to change sides.170  
France’s Air Force, meanwhile, flew nocturnally along Chad’s border with Sudan to detect 
guerrilla incursions.171  France’s entire military contingent and Chad’s best units deployed 
behind the MRA’s screen of village militias, poised to destroy rebel bands upon their detection.   
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French policymakers sought all-the-while to deprive FROLINAT of its Sudanese 
sanctuary.  French diplomats led the way in persuading Sudanese dictator Jaafar Numayri to 
crack down on FROLINAT.  Numayri responded favorably to France’s demarches and offered 
to evict the rebels in August 1971 in exchange for Tombalbye severing relations with Israel.172  
Tombalbye, however, resisted Numayri’s proposal and entertained an Israeli counterproposal 
to send increased aid to Sudanese rebels via Chad.173  Cortadellas compensated for 
Tombalbye’s intransigence by building outposts along the Sudanese border, whose 
commanders developed cordial relations with their Sudanese counterparts.  At least once, in 
mid-1971, Cortadellas exploited fresh intelligence to attack a rebel base 2km within Sudan.174         
Reports on rebels’ preparations spurred Wibaux and Cortadellas on.  Gaddafi poured 
arms and equipment into FROLINAT’s Sudanese bases and Radio Tripoli’s transmitters 
broadcast FROLINAT’s message throughout Chad.175  Libya’s largess attracted guerrillas and 
recruits to FROLINAT’s bases.  Guerrilla numbers in Sudan consequently swelled from 300 
in August 1971 to 1,000 by January 1972.176  FROLINAT’s leadership divided this force into 
four columns, each of which would escort camel caravans loaded with armaments into distinct 
sectors of central Chad where they would liberate zones and recruit guerrillas.177    
The French, however, completed their preparations before FROLINAT launched its 
offensive in February 1972.  Better intelligence—from Sudanese sources, reconnaissance 
aircraft and militias—detected all four rebel columns before they reached their objectives.  
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Cortadellas then directed French heliborne infantry and attack aircraft to shatter the columns 
one-by-one between 18 February and 9 March.178  The columns’ defeat, however, only signaled 
a debut to the rebels’ suffering.  Pro-government militias slaughtered residual rebel groups 
whenever they sought supplies from villages.  France and its Chadian allies thus eliminated 60 
percent (600 rebels) of FROLINAT’s Sudan-based guerrillas in this short campaign.179 
French diplomacy consolidated the victories achieved by French and Chadian arms.  
Pompidou’s state visit, during his first presidential voyage to Africa, persuaded Tombalbye to 
sever his ties with Israel in February 1972.  This, in turn, convinced Numayri to extirpate 
FROLINAT’s Sudanese bases.  He ordered his army to assault FROLINAT’s bases in April 
1972, where they massacred 400 insurgents.180  Without its Sudanese sanctuaries, FROLINAT 
could not reignite the war in central Chad.  In a final diplomatic triumph, Foccart, through 
Niger’s President Diori, convinced Gaddafi to cease supporting Chad’s rebels in exchange for 
de facto control over the Aozou strip along the Chado-Libyan border.181 
France’s destruction of central Chad’s rebels together with Sudan’s crack down on 
FROLINAT’s sanctuary met Pompidou’s requirement of creating acceptable conditions for 
France’s withdrawal.  France therefore evacuated its expeditionary force between June and 
August 1972.182  France’s African allies regarded its intervention as a success.  France had 
reestablished the Chadian government’s authority over the productive regions of central Chad 
and confined the rebellion to desert zones.183  The Franco-Chadian counterinsurgency, 
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meanwhile, decimated the rebellion, inflicting 5,100 casualties in exchange for 39 French killed 
and 102 wounded, and 629 Chadian military casualties.184   
French policymakers knew, even as they withdrew, that Chad’s prospects were bleak.  
France’s withdrawal conceded northern Chad to the Tubus, whose strength would only grow 
with time.185  Foccart, meanwhile, predicted that Gaddafi would renege on his commitment to 
cease interfering in Chad and would soon again fuel Chad’s strife with infusions of weaponry.  
Chad’s Army was still unprepared for such an eventuality.  Helicopters had been central to 70 
percent of Franco-Chadian forces’ successes and France’s withdrawal of its helicopter force 
deprived Chad’s government of this key capability.186  Falling world cotton prices further 
aggravated Chad’s financial difficulties at this time.187 
French leaders, in other words, proclaimed victory even as they knew that Chad’s civil 
war would continue.  Frustrated officers eventually assassinated Tombalbye in 1975, but even 
the ensuing military regime failed to staunch the rebellion.  The Derdeï’s son, Goukouni 
Oueddei, conquered Chad’s capital in 1979, precipitating an even bloodier civil war and three 
further French interventions.  France’s 1968-72 military intervention thus achieved its goal of 
ostentatiously demonstrating France’s alliance commitments’ credibility, but failed in its 
nominal purpose of pacifying Chad. 
 
Conclusion 
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France’s 1968-72 intervention constitutes a forgotten turning point in the Fifth 
Republic’s foreign relations.  De Gaulle personally committed soldiers to battle for the last 
time when he ordered the 1969 Chadian intervention.  The ensuing operations represented both 
France’s first counterinsurgency following the Algeria War and its first intervention in 
response to an African leader’s invocation of bilateral accords.  The Chadian War, finally, 
posed the first serious threat to France’s post-colonial order and France’s response tested the 
Gaullist policy repertoire for maintaining France’s chasse gardé.  Coming at such critical 
junctures, the 1968-72 Chad intervention helped redefine both France’s relationship with 
Africa and with its own armed forces. 
France’s 1968-72 Chadian intervention revealed the Gaullist post-colonial order’s 
strengths and drawbacks.  Inter-connected institutions and treaties gave France a 
disproportionate influence over its ex-colonies.  French security guarantees underscored this 
system, whereby francophone African leaders continued to accept French economic and 
political leadership.  French leaders discovered in Chad, however, that they had fewer choices 
and needed to dedicate more resources to fulfilling these commitments than de Gaulle had 
intended.  Chad’s civil war, within this context, put paid to de Gaulle’s original concept that 
French leaders would freely decide when and where to intervene and would be able to resolve 
most crises with short, sharp interventions. 
Policymakers instead discovered that civil wars generated entrapment risks.  
Prosperous ex-colonies’ leaders judged French security commitments’ value according to how 
France responded to crises in less valued ex-colonies.  Thus, although French analysts viewed 
intervening in Chad as irrational from a cost/benefit perspective, they found themselves 
pressured into intervening by other francophone governments—particularly Madagascar, 
Niger and Cameroon—that let it be known that they would interpret failing to support 
Tombalbye as a sign that they too could not count on France.  
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This dynamic, first revealed in Chad, ironically compels French leaders to intervene 
most frequently in their least valuable ex-colonies.  France has, indeed, intervened 16 times in 
African civil wars since 1965.188  Fully 62 percent of these interventions occurred in four ex-
colonies—Chad, Mali, Mauritania and the Central African Republic—whose vast territories 
and economic poverty generate chronic governance problems.  Foccart declared retrospectively 
about France’s entrapment problem that, “Francophone Africa is like a single garment that, if 
you allow someone to tug on a single thread, will eventually unravel in its entirety.”189 
France’s entrapment in African wars challenged, in turn, de Gaulle’s post-Algeria 
design for France’s military.  Whereas de Gaulle intended to reconfigure France’s Army as a 
conscript-based force focused on Europe, interventions in Africa demanded lightweight, 
professional units.  The 1968-72 intervention alone forced de Gaulle’s successors to begin 
revisiting his blueprint.  De Gaulle’s objective of stationing no more than 6,600 personnel in 
Africa succumbed to the need to deploy 2,851 to Chad alone.  France’s government then 
professionalized infantry units to provide the 4,000 personnel who rotated through Chad during 
this intervention.190  Subsequent interventions forced Paris to deploy more forces to Africa and 
professionalize additional units. 
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French forces in Africa never dropped below 7,900 until the Cold War’s end and 
swelled to 14,000 on occasion.191  Deploying forces of this size obliged France’s Defense 
Ministry to professionalize more units, progressing from the 3rd RIMa in 1969-70 to two full 
divisions by the late-1970s.192  France’s expanding professional units changed, in turn, the 
Army’s character.  Rather than becoming the homogenous Europe-focused force that de Gaulle 
desired, the Army evolved into a two-tiered force redolent of the 19th century, when France 
possessed a conscript-based mass army for Europe and a professional colonial army.  As in the 
late-19th century, the professional units attracted France’s best officer cadets, who rose to 
dominate the Army.193  This meant that, contrary to other European armies that 
professionalized after the Cold War, officers experienced in overseas interventions already 
controlled France’s Army before its government professionalized the armed forces in 1996.   
While de Gaulle’s successors modified his force structure, they upheld his civil-military 
legacy.  De Gaulle regarded field commanders’ excessive authority as a primary reason why 
governments lost control of earlier colonial wars.  De Gaulle therefore deliberately 
“civilianized” decision-making in Chad by appointing Ambassador Wibaux to supervise the 
intervention and by establishing the civilian-run MRA to manage the intervention’s non-
military components.  One commander, Arnaud, was sacked because he opposed these 
arrangements and his successor, Cortadellas, learned to work within them.  Subsequent French 
presidents built upon this legacy and exploited new technologies to better control operations, 
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such as when President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing personally authorized each airstrike in 
Mauretania by mobile telephone in 1978.      
In addition to altering who controlled interventions, the Fifth Republic also transformed 
how France conducted military operations.  By empowering civilians, the new institutions 
ensured that civilian, rather than military, preferences prevailed.  Whereas military 
commanders previously pursued comprehensive victories through lengthy 
counterinsurgencies, civilian leaders now imposed a more limited and tightly regulated form 
of warfare.  Strategic satisficing—meaning the use of minimal force to produce satisfactory 
outcomes—became French operations’ new leitmotif.  Officers adapted to this changing reality 
by ceasing to advocate for lengthy guerre revolutionnaire campaigns and instead championing 
professionalism’s virtues for limited opérations extérieures, or OpEx as they became known.  
Governments’ ability to limit the scope and length of their operations lowered, in turn, 
the political costs of intervening.  France consequently intervened more frequently in Sub-
Saharan Africa than any other power and is credited with mounting 135 distinct operations 
since 1945.194  Although many were small, consisting of expatriate evacuations and disaster 
relief, France launched 16 major interventions since 1965 in response to intra-state wars.  
African perceptions of France as a reliable partner encouraged governments to seek 
cooperation agreements with it.  France’s 1968-72 Chadian intervention, for example, 
persuaded Belgium’s ex-colonies—Burundi (1969), Congo-Zaire (1974) and Rwanda 
(1975)—to sign military accords with France.195  France’s continuing willingness to intervene 
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later won it the sobriquet of “Africa’s gendarme” and enticed Anglophone states, including the 
Seychelles (1979), Malawi (1980) and Zimbabwe (1992), to also bind themselves to it.196 
Although satisficing enables France to intervene with the frequency needed to preserve 
its chasse gardé, these interventions can generate less salutary outcomes for France’s African 
partners.  Strategic satisficing, by definition, involves employing only enough force to achieve 
minimal objectives, which are often limited to upholding pre-existing French commitments.  
The results of France’s limited interventions ought, within this context, to be judged against 
the alternatives of France either refusing to intervene or its intervening with decisive force.   
In the case of France’s 1968-72 Chadian intervention, the final outcome was arguably 
worse than either of these alternatives.  FROLINAT could have ended the war by seizing power 
in the early-1970s.  Likewise, a French commitment to decisively defeating the rebellion—
deploying more forces for a longer period of time—might have vanquished northern Chad’s 
rebels and returned the country to a state of peace.  France’s actual, limited intervention was 
pernicious compared to both of these alternatives since by degrading, but not destroying Chad’s 
rebellion, France inadvertently prolonged that civil war until 1979.      
France’s later interventions in Chad—Operations Tacaud, Manta and Epervier—
superficially fit the same pattern.  France deployed enough force each time to prevent Libyan-
backed insurgents from seizing Chad’s capital, but never enough to end the conflict.  France’s 
interventions in the Central African Republic, likewise, temporarily saved the regimes of 
Presidents Ange-Félix Patassé and François Bozizé, yet arguably prolonged civil wars and 
failed to arrest the state’s gradual collapse.  Although it would be going too far to argue that 
French interventions’ net impact was negative, the available evidence suggests that they rarely 
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ended conflicts as France re-intervened, within five years of its departure, in 58 percent of the 
states where it intervened.197      
In short, strategic satisficing—an approach far different from traditional French 
counterinsurgency practices—facilitates the Fifth Republic’s interventionism.  The tightly-
coupled application of military force and diplomacy in pursuit of limited objectives enables an 
otherwise medium-sized state, France, to serve as Africa’s gendarme, intervening in intra-state 
conflicts and upholding security agreements.  It is doubtful, however, that France’s particular 
style of intervention serves African interests as well as French ones, since France’s limited 
interventions and strategic satisficing prolongs, rather than ends civil wars.              
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